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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 
Kevin C. Walsh is a Virginia resident and a member of the faculty at the 
University of Richmond School of Law. He teaches and writes in the areas of 
federal jurisdiction, constitutional law, and complex litigation. Walsh is the author 
of a forthcoming essay in the Stanford Law Review presenting previously 
unidentified arguments that require dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit for lack of 
jurisdiction.1 These arguments were not presented by either party, despite extensive 
briefing below. Nor were they addressed in the District Court’s two thorough 
opinions or in appellant’s opening brief in this Court. These heretofore neglected 
arguments establish that the federal courts lack statutory subject-matter jurisdiction 
over State declaratory judgment actions like this one, and that Virginia’s lawsuit 
seeks an advisory opinion outside the bounds of Article III jurisdiction. This brief 
presents these arguments and explains why they require reversal and dismissal. 2  
                                           
1 See Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slew the Mandate, 64 Stanford Law Review 
____ (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_ 
id=1748550 (last visited March 4, 2011). 
2 This brief takes no position on the constitutionality of the individual mandate or 
on the justiciability of the private-party challenges in the Liberty University case. 
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or 
entity, other than amicus, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation and submission of this brief. The parties have consented to the filing of 
this brief. Walsh’s institutional affiliation is noted for identification purposes only. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Virginia’s lawsuit relies on a novel vehicle to seek a federal declaratory 
judgment: a declaratory state statute designed to carry Virginia into federal court 
for a declaratory judgment about the constitutionality of a federal law. Established 
Supreme Court precedent requires dismissal of the claim that has been concocted 
and carried into court by means of this contrivance.  
There are three independent grounds for dismissing Virginia’s lawsuit for 
lack of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. First, the Supreme Court has held that 
“[t]he situation presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of the validity of state 
law is … not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts.”3 
This holding requires dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit, which seeks a declaration 
that state law is not preempted by federal law. 
Second, the Supreme Court has held that there is no statutory jurisdiction 
over a federal declaratory judgment action unless one of the parties to the 
declaratory action could have brought a nondeclaratory action about the same issue 
against the other party.4 That condition is not met here. Virginia challenges the 
individual mandate, a statutory provision not enforceable by the federal 
                                           
3 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1983).  
4 See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72 (1950); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 804-05 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the holding of Skelly Oil and 
subsequent applications of the Skelly Oil test). 
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government against Virginia. The basis for this challenge is Virginia’s Health Care 
Freedom Act, a statute not enforceable by Virginia against the federal government. 
Thus neither party could sue the other in federal court in a nondeclaratory action 
concerning the enforceability of the individual mandate. There is therefore no 
jurisdiction over Virginia’s declaratory judgment action concerning the same issue. 
Third, Congress has limited the availability of declaratory relief to “a case of 
actual controversy.”5  This is not such a case. Rather, Virginia’s lawsuit amounts to 
a request for an advisory opinion about the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate. In the guise of a declaratory judgment action about the validity of its 
declaratory state statute, Virginia actually seeks a ruling about the law that would 
apply if and when there is an actual controversy between the federal government 
and a Virginia resident who seeks to avoid the obligation of the individual 
mandate. 
This last statutory ground for jurisdictional dismissal overlaps with the case 
or controversy requirement of Article III.6 As such, it provides a statutory hook for 
the Article III standing arguments advanced by the federal government (which are 
sound). But because of this overlap, this third statutory ground differs from the 
                                           
5 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
6 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (“[T]he phrase 
‘case of actual controversy’ in the [Declaratory Judgment] Act refers to the types 
of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III.”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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other two in an important respect. Those two grounds enable this Court to order 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction without making any constitutional determination. 
“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless 
absolutely necessary to the decision of the case.”7 There is no reason to exempt 
constitutional determinations under Article III from this salutary practice of 
constitutional avoidance. 
“Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is … limited to those subjects 
encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.”8 It is inconsequential for 
resolution of this appeal that the parties have thus far failed to address the absence 
of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. “[E]very federal appellate court has a 
special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of 
the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to 
concede it.”9  
The jurisdictional analysis requiring dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit has 
significance far beyond this one case.10 Other States have enacted opposition to the 
                                           
7 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
8 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 695, 701 (1982). 
9 Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). 
10 One readily available indicator of its importance can be seen in Judge Vinson’s 
decision in Florida v. HHS, which adopted wholesale the jurisdictional analysis for 
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individual mandate into state law, and have done so using the vehicle of a 
declaratory state statute they hope to ride into federal court to invalidate the 
individual mandate.11 Moreover, health care is just one issue on which some States 
are pushing back against the federal government.12  
A State cannot interpose itself between its citizens and the federal 
government by means of a parens patriae action against the federal government—
as Virginia appropriately conceded below.13 A State is not permitted to accomplish 
the same interposition simply by first enacting a declaratory statute to codify 
disagreement with federal law before repairing to federal court. Such interposition 
                                                                                                                                        
state standing from Judge Hudson’s opinion in this case. See Florida v. HHS, ___ 
F. Supp. 2d ___, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. 2011). 
11 Legal measures opposing various aspects of healthcare reform were introduced 
in over 40 state legislatures in 2009 and 2010, and Virginia was just one of seven 
states to enact opposition to an individual mandate into state law in 2010. See 
Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain Health 
Reforms, 2010-11, National Conference of State Legislatures (last updated 
February 22, 2011), at http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18906. The other states enacting 
a mandate-exemption statute in 2010 were Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Missouri, and Utah. Id. 
12 See Tenth Amendment Center, The Tenth Amendment Nullification Movement, 
at http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement/ 
(providing resources for tracking state nullification legislation involving firearms 
regulation, marijuana laws, and cap and trade, among other issues). 
13 Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112] (“Virginia recognizes 
that Massachusetts v. Mellon stands for the proposition that States cannot sue the 
federal government under parens patriae principles . . . .”). 
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is inconsistent with the constitutional structure of the United States.14 It cannot be 
sanctioned by this Court.  
ARGUMENT 
 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Virginia’s lawsuit is outside 
both statutory and constitutional limits. Because there is no statutory subject-matter 
jurisdiction, however, this Court need not (and therefore should not) reach any 
constitutional question of Article III jurisdiction. 
I. There Is No Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
over Virginia’s Lawsuit 
 
Virginia relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (the grant of general federal-question 
jurisdiction) and 2201 (the statutory authorization for declaratory relief) for 
statutory jurisdiction.15 But the Supreme Court has imposed limits on the ability of 
federal courts to grant declaratory relief under § 2201, and has incorporated these 
limits as jurisdictional limitations into § 1331.16  The most directly applicable limit 
                                           
14 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 (1819) (“The Government of the 
Union . . . is, emphatically and truly, a Government of the people. In form and in 
substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be 
exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”). 
15 Compl. at 3 [JA 30]. 
16 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 18 (“Having interpreted the Declaratory 
Judgment Act of 1934 to include certain limitations on the jurisdiction of federal 
district courts to entertain declaratory judgment suits, we should be extremely 
hesitant to interpret the Judiciary Act of 1875 and its 1887 amendments [i.e., the 
general grant of federal question jurisdiction] in a way that renders the limitations 
in the later statute nugatory.”). 
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is set forth in Franchise Tax Board, which forecloses certain federal declaratory 
judgment actions brought by States.17 Another limit is set forth in Skelly Oil, which 
applies to all federal declaratory judgment actions.18 Each independently requires 
dismissal. 
A. Franchise Tax Board Requires Dismissal 
 
The Supreme Court held in Franchise Tax Board that “[t]he situation 
presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of the validity of state law is … not 
within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts.”19 This holding 
simply and squarely forecloses federal jurisdiction in this lawsuit, in which 
Virginia asks the court to “declare that [Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act] is a 
                                           
17 See id. at 21-22. 
18 See Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671-72. 
19 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22. In Franchise Tax Board, a California 
agency filed a claim in state court (which was later removed into federal court) to 
secure a declaration that California tax law was not preempted by ERISA. Id. at 5-
7. The Supreme Court had previously interpreted the federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act to include certain limits on federal jurisdiction over declaratory judgment 
actions filed in federal court. Id. at 14-22. To prevent circumvention of those limits 
through removal of a state court action, the Court determined that the limitations it 
had previously found in the federal Act would also apply whenever a litigant 
sought to bring a state declaratory judgment action into federal court. See id. at 18-
19. Because removal jurisdiction is co-extensive with original jurisdiction, the 
Court’s holding applies not only to cases removed into federal court, but also to 
those filed there originally. See id.  Most important for present purposes, the Court 
in Franchise Tax Board did more than simply expand the category of actions 
covered by prior limitations on federal declaratory judgments. The Supreme Court 
imposed a new limitation on jurisdiction that applies when a State seeks 
declaratory relief under § 2201. See id. at 21-22. 
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valid exercise of state power.”20 As the district court noted (in the course of 
analyzing a different point), the primary objective of Virginia’s federal declaratory 
judgment lawsuit is to determine the validity of Virginia law.21  
The Court explained in Franchise Tax Board that allowing federal 
jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits by States seeking to validate state laws 
would be “removed from the spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district 
court jurisdiction that informed” its earlier interpretations of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.22 The underlying dispute in Franchise Tax Board was over a 
purported conflict between ERISA and state tax law.23 But the Court did not limit 
the formulation of its holding to foreclosing federal jurisdiction over only those 
kinds of disputes, and that holding requires dismissal here.24   
                                           
20 Compl. at 6 [JA 33]. 
21 Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (explaining that 
the “primary articulated objective” of the lawsuit is “to defend the Virginia Health 
Care Freedom Act from the conflicting effect of an allegedly unconstitutional 
federal law”).  
22 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22. 
23 Id. at 4-7. 
24 Cf. Missouri ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm’n v. Cuffley, 112 F.3d 
1332, 1336 (8th Cir. 1997) (“There is a minor distinction between Franchise Tax 
Board and the instant case: that case involved a conflict between a federal statute 
and a state statute, while the case at bar presents a conflict between the federal 
Constitution and state administrative action. Nevertheless, we see no reason why 
the Franchise Tax Board holding should not apply to the case before us.”). 
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In addition to the declaratory relief foreclosed by Franchise Tax Board, 
Virginia also asks for “such further and additional relief as the ends of justice may 
require including an injunction against the enforcement of § 1501 in particular and 
PPACA as a whole.” Id. As this wording reveals, the request for an injunction is 
ancillary to the request for declaratory relief. A court cannot reach the additional 
remedy of an injunction without first making the declaration of state-law validity 
that Franchise Tax Board holds to be beyond the jurisdiction granted by Congress 
in § 1331. Consequently, Virginia’s claim for the “further and additional relief” of 
an injunction cannot be independently salvaged from its fatally flawed claim for 
declaratory relief.25  
Some scholars have suggested that Franchise Tax Board can be understood 
as a kind of abstention decision.26 To resist application of Franchise Tax Board, 
then, Virginia might argue that the rationale of the rule does not apply because, 
unlike the claim at issue in Franchise Tax Board, there is no state court with 
authority to issue the relief Virginia seeks. This distinction is a real one. Yet it 
provides even more of a reason to apply the rule of Franchise Tax Board and 
dismiss Virginia’s lawsuit. The tax law at issue in Franchise Tax Board imposed 
                                           
25 Additionally, as explained in more detail below, the federal court lacks Article 
III jurisdiction to issue the requested injunction. 
26 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 810-11 (6th ed. 2009). 
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obligations on individuals whom the state could then pursue in a state-court 
collection action or at least name as proper defendants in a state-court declaratory 
judgment action.27 By contrast, there is no state-court action that Virginia could 
bring to enforce its Health Care Freedom Act. To ask a Virginia court to opine on 
such a law’s validity in the absence of a proper defendant would be to request a 
forbidden advisory opinion.28 Moving the same claim into federal court and adding 
the Secretary as a nominal defendant does not render the resulting opinion any less 
advisory.29  
In sum, Franchise Tax Board forecloses statutory subject-matter jurisdiction 
over a State’s declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of a law that a 
                                           
27 See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21 (explaining that States “have a variety of 
means by which they can enforce their own laws in their own courts”). 
28 See, e.g., Fairfax v. Shanklin, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (Va. 1964) (“[T]he courts 
are not constituted, and the declaratory judgment statute was not intended to vest 
them with authority, to render advisory opinions, to decide moot questions or to 
answer inquiries which are merely speculative.”). 
29 This line of analysis also explains why Franchise Tax Board provides no support 
for Virginia even if it is interpreted as a decision that involves an element of 
deference to state forum preferences. Whatever such deference Franchise Tax 
Board might be thought to embody, Virginia cannot get around the ultimately 
advisory nature of its claims. See infra Section II. Moreover, if the District Court 
was wrong about the “declaratory nature” of the state law, and there existed some 
way in which it could be enforced against a person who sought to impose an 
obligation on a Virginia citizen to purchase insurance, this would still not aid 
Virginia’s attempt to distinguish Franchise Tax Board. In such a case, Virginia 
would be acting to protect a particular individual using a parens patriae theory, 
which Virginia has appropriately acknowledged is unavailable to support its suit 
against the United States. Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112]. 
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State actually could enforce in court. It would make little sense to interpret the 
precedent nevertheless to allow for jurisdiction over a State’s declaratory judgment 
action to determine the validity of a state law that cannot serve as the basis of a 
state-court enforcement action. Franchise Tax Board cannot be meaningfully 
distinguished; it requires dismissal of Virginia’s lawsuit. 
B. Skelly Oil Requires Dismissal 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Skelly Oil also requires dismissal of 
Virginia’s lawsuit. The Skelly Oil approach to § 2201 allows federal courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over only those actions in which either the declaratory 
judgment plaintiff or the declaratory judgment defendant could have brought a 
nondeclaratory action against the other party concerning the same issue.30 Put 
another way, federal jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action brought under 
§ 2201 “depends on the answer to a hypothetical question: had the Declaratory 
Judgment Act not been enacted, would there have been a nondeclaratory action (i) 
concerning the same issue, (ii) between the same parties, (iii) that itself would have 
been within the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction?”31   
                                           
30 See Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671 (stating that the Declaratory Judgment Act 
“enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend 
their jurisdiction”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 804-05 (6th ed. 2009). 
31 Fallon, et al., supra, at 804. 
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Here, the answer to that hypothetical question is plainly “no.” Virginia 
possesses no right to nondeclaratory relief against the Secretary’s enforcement of 
the individual mandate. Virginia may not seek an injunction prohibiting the 
Secretary’s enforcement of the individual mandate against its citizens because that 
would be a parens patriae action forbidden by Massachusetts v. Mellon.32 Nor may 
Virginia seek an injunction prohibiting the Secretary’s enforcement of the 
individual mandate against Virginia: the individual mandate is not enforceable 
against Virginia, only against individuals.33  
Injunctions do not run against statutes, but against actors. According to the 
Supreme Court, “[i]f a case for preventive relief be presented, the court enjoins, in 
effect, not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute 
                                           
32 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). 
33 See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501 (imposing minimum insurance coverage 
requirement on “applicable individuals”); Mem. of D. in Support of Mot. to 
Dismiss at 1 [JA 49] (“[T]he only provision Virginia challenges in this litigation – 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), which 
requires individuals either to obtain a minimum level of health insurance or to pay 
a penalty if they do not – will impose no obligations on the Commonwealth, even 
after the law takes effect some four years from now. The provision applies only to 
individuals, not the state government.”); id. at 12 [JA 60] (stating that the 
individual mandate provision “does not impose any obligations whatsoever on 
Virginia as a state”); Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 18-19 [JA 118-
19] (“As Secretary Sebelius concedes, Virginia will not be required to pay the 
penalty for failure to meet the Individual Mandate. . . . Virginia will incur no direct 
financial liability under the challenged penalty provision.”); Virginia v. Sebelius, 
702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that Virginia is “a sovereign 
entity not required to purchase insurance under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act”).  
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notwithstanding.”34 Virginia accepts this basic principle.35 But once this principle 
is applied to the individual mandate, Virginia’s inability to seek injunctive relief 
against the Secretary’s enforcement of that law against Virginia is clear. The 
reason is simple: If the Secretary can take no action against Virginia pursuant to 
the individual mandate, there is no basis for a federal court to enjoin “the acts of 
the official, the statute notwithstanding.”36 As already mentioned, and as its 
popular name suggests, the “individual mandate” does not apply to Virginia—only 
to individuals. 
Because Virginia’s lawsuit cannot satisfy the Skelly Oil test, it is not within 
the statutory subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. This Court should 
order dismissal for that independent reason. 
II. Virginia’s Lawsuit Is Not “a Case of Actual 
Controversy”  
 
If this Court concludes that either Franchise Tax Board or Skelly Oil 
requires dismissal for lack of statutory jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to reach a 
determination about Article III jurisdiction. But if this Court concludes that neither 
of these precedents bars Virginia’s lawsuit, the Court still should order dismissal—
                                           
34 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488. 
35 Compl. at 7 [JA 34] (requesting “an injunction against the enforcement of 
§ 1501 in particular and PPACA as a whole”) (emphasis added).  
36 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 488. 
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because Virginia’s lawsuit does not present a justiciable case or controversy under 
Article III. Rather, Virginia seeks an advisory opinion regarding the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the validity of its Health Care 
Freedom Act. 
A. Virginia Seeks an Advisory Opinion 
    
To ensure that the Declaratory Judgment Act would not enable courts to 
exceed the bounds of Article III, Congress made this remedy available only in “a 
case of actual controversy.”37 This statutory language is to be interpreted as co-
extensive with the case or controversy limitation of Article III.38 This Court should 
order dismissal because Virginia’s action is an attempt to obtain an advisory 
opinion in the absence of a justiciable case or controversy.  
For there to be an “actual controversy” cognizable under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and Article III, a dispute must be “definite and concrete, touching 
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”39 The dispute must 
                                           
37 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
38 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the [Declaratory Judgment] Act refers to the 
types of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
39 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); see also id. at 239-
40 (“The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to ‘cases of actual 
controversy,’ manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative 
only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.”). 
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“admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, as 
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical 
state of facts.”40 By these standards, Virginia has failed to present a justiciable 
controversy. 
Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act imposes no legal obligation, but instead 
purports to create an immunity from being legally obligated to buy insurance.41 
Presumably, Virginia’s interest lies in seeing that this immunity is given effect in 
preference to the federal mandate. But both the federal mandate and the state 
immunity relate to the legal obligations of individuals, not the State, vis-à-vis the 
federal government. In essence, Virginia seeks a ruling about what law would 
apply if and when there is an actual controversy between the federal government 
and a Virginia resident over the individual mandate. Virginia is not a necessary 
party to such a controversy.42 The present action is nothing more than an attempt to 
obtain an advisory opinion in advance of such an actual controversy.43  
                                           
40 Id.; see also MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 127 (adopting the foregoing 
descriptions of the meaning of “actual controversy”). 
41 See Va. Code § 38.2-3430.1. (“No resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be 
required to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage . . . .”); see 
also Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that 
the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act is of “a declaratory nature”). 
42 Virginia would, of course, have an interest that would suffice under Rule 24 to 
allow it to intervene to defend its law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24; Diamond v. Charles, 
476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986). But a right to defend a state law attacked in an existing 
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The Supreme Court has long forbidden this sort of litigation. Texas v. ICC,44 
New Jersey v. Sargent,45 and Georgia v. Stanton,46 are all examples of cases in 
which a State claimed that a particular exercise of federal legislative authority was 
beyond the federal government’s power. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court 
held that a State’s simple request for such a ruling “does not present a case or 
controversy within the range of the judicial power as defined by the 
Constitution.”47 Yet that is precisely what Virginia’s lawsuit seeks. The lawsuit 
                                                                                                                                        
case is not equivalent to a right to use that state law to generate a case or 
controversy to attack conflicting federal law. 
43 Cf. Intl. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Los Angeles, 611 F. Supp. 315, 318 
(D.C. Cal. 1986) (“The Court has not discovered, nor have the parties cited, a 
single case brought by a state, city or federal government seeking, before the law is 
enforced, a declaratory judgment that a law is constitutional, with the exception of 
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Muskrat established the 
longstanding precedent that a federal court will not, before the law is applied, 
declare laws to be constitutional, because by doing so the court would issue 
advisory opinions.”). 
44 258 U.S. 158 (1922). 
45 269 U.S. 328 (1926). 
46 73 U.S. 50 (1868). 
47 Texas, 258 U.S. at 162; see also id. (describing as “an abstract question of 
legislative power” the question of whether the matters addressed in the challenged 
legislation “fall within the field wherein Congress may speak with constitutional 
authority, or within the field reserved to the several States”); New Jersey, 269 U.S. 
at 334 (dismissing a State’s bill in equity upon concluding that “its real purpose is 
to obtain a declaration that in making certain parts of the Federal Water Power Act 
… Congress exceeded its own authority and encroached on that of the state”); id. 
(“[T]he bill does not show that any right of the State, which in itself is an 
appropriate subject of judicial cognizance, is being, or about to be, affected 
prejudicially by the application or enforcement of the Act.”); Georgia, 73 U.S. at 
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does not deal with the adverse legal relations of Virginia and the federal 
government. Indeed, it cannot: the individual mandate is not enforceable by the 
federal government against Virginia. Rather, Virginia’s lawsuit deals with 
competing claims “of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government”48 that 
are not within judicial cognizance in this lawsuit.49 
B. The Cases Relied upon by Virginia Involve Obligations Imposed on 
States or Their Officers, or Interference with Some Particular Activity 
of the State Itself  
 
The District Court concluded that Virginia had standing.50 Its justiciability 
analysis was incomplete, however, given that it did not address: (1) statutory 
subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) advisory opinion caselaw, or (3) redressability of 
Virginia’s claimed injury. Moreover, the cases relied upon by the District Court 
and Virginia in support of Virginia’s standing are distinguishable. 
Virginia has described the Texas and New Jersey cases as presenting 
situations in which State claims were “abstract because no right of [the] State was 
                                                                                                                                        
76 (dismissing bill in equity for lack of jurisdiction because “the rights in danger 
… must be rights of person or property, not merely political rights, which do not 
belong to the jurisdiction of a court, either in law or equity”). 
48 Georgia, 73 U.S. at 77. 
49 This is not to say, of course, that the constitutionality of the individual mandate 
is entirely beyond the purview of the federal courts. A private-party suit such as 
Liberty University v. Geithner presents distinct justiciability questions about which 
this brief expresses no opinion. 
50 See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d. 598, 607 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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being or about to be affected.”51 And Virginia has sought to escape classification of 
its claim with these non-justiciable claims by pointing to its Health Care Freedom 
Act. But all of the cases that Virginia has identified in which States have been able 
to sue the federal government to avoid preemption involve obligations imposed on 
States or their officers, or interference with some particular activity of the State 
itself. 
In seeking to establish its standing before the District Court, Virginia cited 
cases involving provisions of federal law that imposed obligations directly on the 
State or governmental officers within the State.52 Because the individual mandate 
imposes no such obligation, however, these cases provide no support for 
concluding that Virginia’s challenge to the individual mandate is justiciable.  
Virginia also cited, and the District Court relied on, a different set of equally 
distinguishable cases: lawsuits brought by States challenging federal agency action 
under federal statutory regimes providing an explicit cause of action to challenge 
                                           
51 Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112].  
52 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997) (addressing 
constitutionality of federal statute that purported to “direct state law enforcement 
officers to participate … in the administration of a federally enacted regulatory 
scheme”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (addressing 
constitutionality of federal statute that forced upon States the choice of “either 
accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the instructions of 
Congress”). 
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that action, such as the Administrative Procedure Act.53 These cases differ from 
Virginia’s lawsuit in three important ways. First, the States in those cases relied on 
statutes other than the Declaratory Judgment Act to bring their claims.54 Second, 
by virtue of the way in which the various statutory causes of action were defined, 
those cases involved the legality of a particular action by an agency of the federal 
government that had interfered with some particular activity of the State itself 
(such as issuing permits, promulgating regulations, or undertaking enforcement 
actions).55 Third, by virtue of the particularized nature of these matters, they 
                                           
53 See Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 606-07 (citing Alaska v. U .S. Dep’t 
of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. 
United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008)); Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to 
Dismiss at 16 [JA 116]  (citing Alaska, 868 F.2d at 443-45, Texas Ofc. of Pub. Util. 
Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 1999), Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
766 F.2d 228. 232-33 (6th Cir. 1985), and Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242). 
54 See Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242-44 (engaging in judicial review of ATF 
determination pursuant to APA section 704, which states that “[a]gency action 
made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review”); Texas, 183 F.3d at 405 
(engaging in judicial review of final orders of the Federal Communications 
Commission pursuant to the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2342 and 2344); Alaska, 868 F.2d at 444-45 (engaging in judicial review 
of orders of the Department of Transportation pursuant to the APA and the 
Aviation Act, which includes “a body politic” or a “representative thereof” within 
the class of persons entitled to judicial review); Ohio, 766 F.2d at 232-33 
(engaging in judicial review of a regulation and interpretive rule pursuant to the 
APA and the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act). 
55 See Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1238-44 (concluding that State could challenge ATF 
determination regarding the legal effect of concealed weapons permits issued by 
the State); Texas, 183 F.3d at 408-09 (describing challenges to order setting terms 
of state regulatory and enforcement authority over various aspects of 
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involved an adverse officer or agency whose action could be declared void or 
enjoined to redress the injury that the federal government’s particular challenged 
action had inflicted on the State.56  None of these features is present in this case.  
Virginia has no statutory basis for judicial review apart from the Declaratory 
Judgment Act; it complains of no particular agency action that could be directed 
against it; and the relief that it seeks could not, in any event, redress its asserted 
injury. The first two of these points have already been established above. The next 
section addresses the third point, that Virginia’s asserted injury is not redressable 
by the District Court. 
C. Virginia’s Asserted Injury Is Not Redressable by the District Court 
 
There is no way for the District Court to redress Virginia’s asserted injury to 
its sovereignty without allowing Virginia to assume the forbidden status of parens 
patriae vis-à-vis the federal government.57 “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing separately for each form of relief sought.”58 Yet Virginia has no standing 
to seek the relief of an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the mandate against 
                                                                                                                                        
telecommunications); Alaska, 868 F.2d at 442-43 (explaining how challenged 
Department of Transportation orders interfered with State enforcement of 
deceptive advertising laws against tour operators); Ohio, 766 F.2d at 229-33 
(describing federal regulations that prohibited enforcement of state regulation 
requiring prenotification for shipments of hazardous materials). 
56  See note 55 supra. 
57 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923). 
58 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006). 
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its citizens, because (as Virginia appropriately conceded below) “States cannot sue 
the federal government under parens patriae principles.”59 A State’s suit to protect 
its citizens from the operation of federal law is, of course, nothing but a parens 
patriae action.60 
Nor can Virginia get around this justiciability problem by relying on the 
declaratory relief it seeks. That relief would not redress Virginia’s purported injury 
even if the District Court had statutory subject-matter jurisdiction to order it. 
Indeed, Judge Hudson’s declaration that the individual mandate is unconstitutional 
had no binding legal effect on anyone subject to the individual mandate, whether in 
Virginia or elsewhere. The two ways it could have had a binding legal effect are as 
a matter of precedent or of preclusion. Yet a district court decision has no 
precedential effect.61 And as a matter of preclusion, the judgment binds only the 
                                           
59 Mem. of Pl. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 12 [JA 112]. 
60 See Mellon, 262 U.S., at 485 (describing parens patriae suits initiated by a State 
against the United States as “judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United 
States from the operation of the statutes thereof”). 
61 See F.T.C. v. Tarriff, 584 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“district court 
decision binding on no court”); Midlock v. Apple Vacations West, Inc., 406 F.3d 
453, 458 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]s we have noted repeatedly, a district court decision 
does not have stare decisis effect; it is not a precedent.”); Threadgill v. Armstrong 
World Industries, Inc., 928 F.3d 1366, 1371 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Even where the 
facts of a prior district court case are, for all practical purposes, the same as those 
presented to a different district court in the same district, the prior resolution of 
those claims does not bar reconsideration by this Court of similar contentions. The 
doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the 
decision of another.”). 
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parties.62 That binding effect does not amount to much here given that the sole 
party challenging the individual mandate is a party against whom it could not be 
enforced. Importantly, no nonparty litigant (such as Liberty University, the two 
individual plaintiffs in that case, or any other Virginia resident who might wish to 
invoke Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act) could take advantage of the District 
Court’s declaratory judgment through the doctrine of non-mutual offensive issue 
preclusion. That doctrine is unavailable against the federal government.63   
These redressability problems, taken together with the features of this 
lawsuit that distinguish it from the cases relied upon below, amount in the end to 
the same problem analyzed in the advisory opinion section above. Simply put, 
Virginia’s lawsuit does not present an “actual controversy” within the meaning of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act or Article III. The dispute does not “‘admi[t] of 
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an 
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’”64 
                                           
62 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2008) (“[W]e have often 
repeated the general rule that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in 
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made 
a party by service of process.”) (quotation marks and internal citations omitted). 
63 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1984). 
64 MedImmune , Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007), quoting Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937). 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 03/07/2011      Page: 28
    
– 23 – 
CONCLUSION 
 
Notwithstanding all the attention Virginia’s lawsuit has received and all the 
speculation it has engendered, it is not difficult to resolve. There is no statutory 
subject-matter jurisdiction over Virginia’s lawsuit for three independent reasons. 
First, Virginia seeks a declaration of the validity of state law, but the Supreme 
Court has held that “[t]he situation presented by a State’s suit for a declaration of 
the validity of state law is … not within the original jurisdiction of the United 
States district courts.”65 Second, the Supreme Court has held that there is no 
statutory jurisdiction over a federal declaratory judgment action unless either the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff or the declaratory judgment defendant could have 
brought a nondeclaratory action concerning the same issue against the other 
party.66 Yet the individual mandate is not enforceable by the federal government 
against Virginia, and Virginia’s Health Care Freedom Act is not enforceable by 
Virginia against the federal government; these parties consequently cannot bring 
nondeclaratory actions against each other concerning the enforceability of the 
individual mandate. Third, Virginia’s lawsuit presents no actual controversy under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act or Article III. 
                                           
65 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22. 
66 See Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671-72; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 805 (6th ed. 2009). 
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Because there is no statutory or Article III jurisdiction over Virginia’s 
lawsuit, amicus curiae respectfully requests that the Court vacate the order of the 
District Court and remand with instructions to dismiss. 
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